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RIGHTS ACCRUING TO A HUSBAND UPON MARRIAGE
WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY OF HIS WIFE
James W. Day*

T

common law,1 like the Roman Law2 and many others of its
prototypes, restricted the activities of the married woman with a
view toward assuring her subservience to her husband. 3 These restrictions limited her capacity to own and control property of various kinds
and vested correlative powers and estates or interests in her husband.
With the decline in importance of the feudal objectives sought to be
furthered by these common-law restrictions, which accompanied the
evolution of the modern social order, various devices were successively
engrafted by court action or statute on the existing body of the law,
with the result that the harshness of the original doctrines was alleviated under specified circumstances. The rights and estates that were
given to the wife by these innovations were respectively denominated as
her equity to a settlement, her separate equitable estate, and her separate statutory property; and each lessened the power of control over her
property that prior thereto had been exercisable by her husband. Confusion has frequently resulted from a failure to differentiate among the
interests and estates in question with the result that the characteristics
and legal effects that are peculiar to each have at times been ascribed
erroneously to the others.
Attention is directed in this article to the principles of the common
law and the features of the subsequent developments that are believed
to be of greatest current value either because the particular doctrine
still persists or because it aids in the evaluation of a precedent for use
in a legal background that differs from that of the period or jurisdiction
in which the decision was rendered.
HE

The Situation at Common Law
Estate during coverture (jure uxoris). At common law a husband
acquired an estate during coverture in all present freehold estates4 of
"' Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1 Cf. 2 PoLLOCK AND MArrLAND, HxsTORY OF ENGLISH
2 SoHM INsT., 3d ed., Ledlie, §93 (1907).

LAw, 2d ed., 399-414 (1905).

8 That these restrictions did not prevent some wives from exercising paramount
influence over family matters and even affairs of state is of course abundantly illustrated
both in history and classical literature; but in the main, the objective of male dominance
was attained.
4 The estate did not arise in a remainder or reversion owned by the wife that was
subsequent to a freehold estate. Cf. 2 BLACKST. CoMM. "'127.
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which his wife was seised at the time of the marriage or of which she
became seised by inheritance, devise, or conveyance, during the continuance of the marriage and before a child of the marriage was born
alive who was capable of inheriting the land. The estate continued
until the marriage was terminated by the death of the husband," by
the death of the wife6 or by divorce, 7 or until a child of the marriage
capable of inheriting the land was born alive.8 Upon the latter event,
the estate during coverture terminated, and the husband acquired an
estate by the curtesy initiate. 9
While the estate during coverture continued, the husband had the
right to the possession and control of the land10 and was entitled to
the rents and profits that accrued.11 Although the husband was jointly
seised of the land with his wife in the right of his wife as long as the
estate during coverture existed, instead of being solely seised of it,1 2
he could alienate it without joining his wife in the conveyance,1 3 and
his creditors could subject it to the payment of their claims to the same
extent as his other freehold estates.14 The estate acquired by one
claiming under the husband of course terminated at the same time as
would have been the case if it had been retained by him, and at that
time the property remained to the wife unaffected by any conveyance
made or debts incurred by the husband.115
15 Evans v. Kingsben:y, 2 Rand. (Va.) 120 (1823).
6 2 BLACXST. COMM. ""433.
1 E.g., Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429 (1852).
8 See, e.g., Lancaster County Bank v. Stauffer, 10 Pa.

398 at 399 (1849); 2 BLACXST.
CoMM. ""126.
9 See note 8 supra. The estate by the curtesy is not within the scope of this article.
10 See, e.g., Blood v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551 at 560, 121 S. 886 (1929).
112 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 2d ed., 407 (1905);
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §484 (1939); see Blood v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551 at 560,
121 s. 886 (1929).
12 E.g., Melvin v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals on Merrimack River, 16 Pick.
(Mass.) 161 (1834); Polyblank v. Hawkins, 1 Doug. 329, 99 Eng. Rep. 211 (1780);
2 PoLLocx AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 408 (1905); 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §484 (1939); Haskins, "Estate by the Marital Right," 97 UNIV. PA. L.
REv. 345 at 348 (1949).
18 E.g., Jones v. Freed, 42 Ark. 357 (1883); Eaton v. Whitaker, 18 Conn. 222
(1846); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §484 (1939); Haskins, ''Estate by the Marital
Right," 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 345 at 348 (1949); see Blood v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551 at 560,
121 s. 886 (1929).
14 E.g., Montgomery v. Tate, 12 Ind. 615 (1859); Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479
(1858); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §484 (1939); Haskins, ''Estate by the Marital
Right," 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 345 at 348 (1949); Litchfield v. Cudworth, 15 Pick.
(Mass.) 23 at 28 (1833); Blood v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551 at 560, 121 S. 886 (1929).
15 E.g., Miller v. Shackelford, 3 Dana (Ky.) 289 (1835); Bruce v. Wood, 1 Mete.
(Mass.) 542 (1840); Munnerlyn v. Munnerlyn, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 2 (1805); Evans v.
Kingsberry, 2 Rand. (Va.) 120 (1823); Co. Ln-r. ""326a; Blackman v. Blackman, 45
Ariz. 374 at 381, 43 P. (2d) 1011 (1935).
'
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Chattels personal. The husband's estate during coverture arose
only in present freehold estates of his wife. At common law, however, he acquired extensive rights by virtue of the marriage in certain
of her other assets. Her chattels personal, for example, by the weight
of authority became his immediately and absolutely without the exercise by him of any act of ownership over them.16 It has, however,
been stated in a few decisions, usually gratuitously and unnecessarily,
that her chattels did not vest in him without such an act of ownership.17
Choses in action. A wife's choses in action, also, became the property of her husband if, and only if, he sufficiently reduced them to
his possession.18 This necessity of a husband's reducing to possession
his wife's choses in action as a prerequisite to acquiring ownership of
them applied not only to choses owned by her at the time of the marriage19 but also, by the weight of authority, to those acquired by her
during the marriage.20 If he did not reduce her choses to possession
until after her death, they did not become his; 21 and if he predeceased
her without having reduced them to possession, they survived to her.22
In order for a husband to reduce to possession his wife's chose, it
was necessary for him to acquire absolute dominion over it, at least for
a time, without the concurrence of his wife.23 When, for example, he
collected the money due on her chose with the intention to devote it
to his own use, it became his property.24 Similarly, if he recovered a
judgment on his wife's chose in his name alone, which he could do in
the case of a bond211 or other chose26 that she had acquired during the
16 E.g., Jordan v. Jordan, 52 Me. 320 (1864); 2 BLACKST. CoMM. "435.
17 See, e.g., Blood v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551 at 560, 121 S. 886 (1929).
18 E.g., Johnson's Admr. v. Johnson, 33 Ala. 284 (1858); Phelps v. Phelps,

20 Pick.
(Mass.) 556 (1838); Hoop and Hoffman v. Plummer, 14 Ohio St. 448 (1863).
19 E.g., Johnson's Admr. v. Johnson, 33 Ala. 284 (1858); Hoop and Hoffman v.
Plummer, 14 Ohio St. 448 (1863).
20 E.g., Phelps v. Phelps, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 556 (1838); Scarpellini v. Atcheson,
7 Q.B. 864, 115 Eng. Rep. 713 (1845). A minority view existed, however, to the effect
that a chose that accrued to the wife during coverture vested in the husband absolutely even
if he did not reduce it to possession•. See, e.g., McKay v. Mayes, 16 Ky. L. 862 at 865,
29 s.w. 327 (1895).
21 E.g., Johnson's Admr. v. Johnson, 33 Ala. 284 (1858); cf. Phelps v. Phelps,
20 Pick. (Mass.) 556 (1838); Scarpellini v. Atcheson, 7 Q.B. 864, 115 Eng. Rep. 713
(1845); 2 BLACKST. CoMM. "435. A wife's chose for rent in arrears that had become
due before the marriage, was, however, given to her husband by a statute, even if she
predeceased him before he had reduced it to possession. 32 Hen. 8, c. 37(4) (1540).
22 2 BLACKST. CoMM. "434.
23 Cf. Nicholson v. Drury Buildings Estate Company, 7 Ch. D. 48 (1876).
24 E.g., Humphries v. Harrison, 30 Ark. 79 (1875); see Hart v. Leete, 104 Mo.
315 at 330, 15 S.W. 976 (1891).
25 See Oglander v. Baston, 1 Vern. 396, 23 Eng. Rep. 540 (1686).
2 0 Hilliard v. Hambridge, Aleyn 36, 82 Eng. Rep. 903 (1648); see Leakey v. Maupin,
10 Mo. 368 (1847).
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marriage, it became his absolutely and passed upon his death to his
personal representative.27 If, however, he joined his wife in the action
in which the judgment was obtained and predeceased her before it
was satisfied, the judgment survived to her. 28 When a husband
assigned his wife's chose in action or pledged it to secure his own debt
with the intent to appropriate it as his own, he sufficiently reduced it
to possession to divest his wife of her property in it.29 But if he merely
took possession of his wife's bond without recovering a judgment on
it or receiving payment of it or altering the security itself, there was
no such reduction to possession as would vest the ownership of it in
him.80

Chattels real. A husband also acquired at common law a qualified
ownership of his wife's estates in land less than freehold. He was entitled to all of the rents and profits arising from them31 and could
alienate or mortgage them for the entire term without the consent of
his wife.32 They could be subjected to the claims of his creditors,88
and if he outlived his wife, they vested in him absolutely.34 If he
predeceased his wife, however, her chattels real could not pass by his
will35 but survived to her. 36
The Wife's Equity to a Settlement
At least as early as the seventeenth century a means was devised to
provide a wife with assets that were partially free from these extensive
controls of her husband. Real or personal property was transferred to
a trustee for her benefit; and the equitable interest thus vested in her
was in a proper situation afforded protection from her husband. 37 Even
27 Oglander

v. Baston, 1 Vern. 396, 23 Eng. Rep. 540 (1686); 2 BLAoxsT. Co:MM.

"'434.
28 See Leakey v. Maupin, 10 Mo. 368 (1847); Oglander v. Baston, 1 Vern. 396, 23
Eng. Rep. 540 (1686).
29 Cf. Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 168, 25 S. 806 (1899)
(involving a husband's assignment of his wife's corporate stock).
30 Pickett & Pickett v. Everett, use of Yallaly, 11 Mo. 568 (1848); see Southern
Bank of Fulton v. Nichols, 235 Mo. 401 at 410, 138 S.W. 881 (1911).
31 2 BLAcxsT. CoMM. *434.
82 Ibid.; see Bates v. Dandy, 2 Atk. 207 at 208, 26 Eng. Rep. 528 (174 l); cf.
In re Bellamy, 25 Ch. D. 620 at 625 (1883).
882 BLAcKST. CoMM. *434; see Allen v. Hooper, 50 Me•• 371 at 374 (1862).
84 In re Bellamy, 25 Ch. D. 620 (1883); 2 BucxsT. CoMM. *434; Co. LITT. *300.
s11 2 BucKsT. CoMM. *434; Co. LITT. *351.
36 2 BLACXST. COMM. *434.
s1 Doyly v. Perfull, 1 Ch. Cas. 225, 21 Eng. Rep. 871 (1673); Haskins, "Estate by
the Marital Right," 97 Umv. PA. L. R:Ev. 345 and 350 (1949); 5 HOLDSWORTH, HxsTORY
oP ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 312-314 (1937).
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such a transfer made by a woman prior to her marriage in trust for herself was upheld. 38 For a time the consent of the present or prospective
husband was a prerequisite to the validity of a trust for a married
woman, whether created by her or by another;39 but later this doctrine
was repudiated. 40 Even thereafter, however, if a woman made a
secret transfer of her assets in trust for herself while the negotiations
with reference to her marriage to an individual were in progress, her
husband could have the transfer invalidated as a fraud on his marital
rights. 41
The equitable interest of a wife in a trust thus established for her
benefit was, to be sure, not entirely beyond the control of her husband,
but neither he42 nor one to whom he had assigned it43 could reach it
except in equity. In that forum the maxim was applied that he who
seeks equity must do equity, and the husband or his assignee of his
wife's equitable interest was usually granted the relief he sought only
upon the condition that a suitable provision be made from the trust
assets or otherwise for the maintenance of the wife and her children.44
The right of a married woman to have such a provision made from
the assets of a trust of which she was the beneficiary, was known as the
wife's equity to a settlement. 45 The equity of the wife to a settlement
was not limited to instances in which a trust had been established for
her benefit, however, but extended also to cases in which other estates
or interests of hers were so situated that they could be reached by her
husband or his assignee or creditor only by a proceeding in equity.46
Thus when a husband or his creditor sought in equity to obtain a
legacy to which his wife was entitled, she could insist upon a settlement;47 and when her land was subject to a mortgage, with the result
88 Doyly v. Perfull, 1 Ch. Cas.
8 9 Sir Edward Turner's Case, 1

225, 21 Eng. Rep. 871 (1673).
Vern. 7, 23 Eng. Rep. 265 (1681).
40 Cf. Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Bro. C.C. 345 at 350, 29 Eng. Rep.
194 (1789).
41 Goddard v. Snow, 1 Russ. 485, 38 Eng. Rep. 187 (1826); cf. Countess of
Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Bro. C.C. 345 at 351, 29 Eng. Rep. 194 (1789); 4 PoMBROY,
EQUITY JtrnisPRUDl!NCB, 5th ed., §1113 (1941); see Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N.C. 197 at
201, 148 S.E. 171 (1929).
42 Earl of Salisbury v. Bennet, Skin. 285, 90 Eng. Rep. 129 (1691).
43 Cf. Macaulay v. Philips, 4 Ves. 15 at 19, 31 Eng. Rep. 8 (1798).
44Cf. Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 My. & Cr. 97, 41 Eng. Rep. 308 (1839); Earl of
Salisbury v. Bennet, Skin. 285, 90 Eng. Rep. 129 (1691).
4 5 Cf Clarke v. McCreary, 20 Miss. (12 S. & M.) 347 at 354 (1849); Poindexter
v. Jeffries, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 363 at 368 (1859).
46 Davis v. Newton, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 537 (1843); see Poindexter v. Jeffries, 15
Gratt. (Va.) 363 at 369 (1859).
47White v. Gouldin's Executors, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 491 (1876).
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under the common-law theory of :mortgages that the legal title was outstanding in the mortgagee, her equity of redemption could be reached
by her husband or his assignee only in equity, and there only subject
to her equity to a settlement.48
When a wife was entitled to a settlement, the English courts in the
absence of special circumstances formerly tended to divide the assets
equally between her and her children on the one hand and her husband on the other,49 but at a later period deviations were made from
this practice.50 Even while the practice prevailed, it was based merely
on the custom of the courts and did not have the weight of a positive
rule; 51 and subsequently it became usual both in England52 and the
United States53 to leave the amount of the wife's settlement to be
determined in each case by the court from the existing facts.
When her husband or one claiming under him attempted to reach
her equitable interest in a trust or sought in equity to obtain other
assets belonging to her, the settlement to which a wife was entitled
was not limited even in England to the provision of necessities for her
and her children.54 It existed, in fact, even though she or her children
had ample other means.55 In the United States, she was entitled to
the entire property if it was needed for the maintenance of her and
her children,56 but in England the whole corpus was not settled on her
unless her husband was insolvent or had been guilty of such gross
misconduct as adultery, cruelty or desertion.57 When he was wholly
unable to maintain her, and the property or fund was small, the English
courts settled all of it upon her;58 but when he was not wholly unable
to support her, their usual practice was to settle on her only a part of
the assets. 59
48 Sturgis

v. Champneys, 5 My. & Cr. 97, 41 Eng. Rep. 308 (1839).
40Re Groves' Trusts, 3 Gif. 575, 66 Eng. Rep. 537 (1862); Bagshaw v. Winter,
5 DeG. & S. 466, 64 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1852); cf. Spirett v. Willows, L.R. 1 Ch. 520 at 521
(1866).
50See In re Suggitt's Trusts, L.R. 3 Ch. 213 at 217 (1868); Kincaid's Trusts, 1
Drew. 326 at 329, 61 Eng. Rep. 477 (1853).
51 lbid.
52 Taunton v. Morris, 11 Ch. D. 779 (1879); Spirett v. Willows, L.R. 1 Ch. 520
(1866); Scott v. Spashett, 3 Macn. & G. 599, 42 Eng. Rep. 391 (1851).
· 53 E.g., Howard v. Napier, 3 Ga. 192 (1847); Davis v. Newton, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 537
(1843); Poindexter v. Jeffries, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 363 (1859).
54 See Carter v. Taggart, 5 DeG. & S. 49 at 54, 64 Eng. Rep. 1013 (1851).
55 lbid.
56 E.g., White v. Gouldin's Executoxs, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 491 (1876).
57 Cf., e.g., In re Suggitt's Trusts, L.R. 3 Ch. 217 (1868).
58 Kincaid's Trusts, 1 Drew. 326, 61 Eng. Rep. 477 (1853); Re Grove's Trusts,
3 Gif. 575 at 583, 66 Eng. Rep. 537 (1862).
59 Re Grove's Trusts, 3 Gif. 575, 66 Eng. Rep. 537 (1862); Bagshaw v. Winter,
5 DeG. & S. 466, 64 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1852); Kincaid's Trusts, 1 Drew. 326 at 329,
61 Eng. Rep. 477 (1853).

1953]

Rmms

OF

HusBAND

IN PROPERTY OF WIFE

869

When a husband had previously received considerable portions
from the other assets of his wife, the amount of the settlement awarded
to her was ordinarily increased.60 Other circumstances that affected
the amount of the wife's settlement were her age, health, and condition,
the value of the assets involved, and the number, age, sex, and health of
her children. 61
The Wife's Separate Equitable Estate
In order to give a married woman greater protection than that available to her under her equity to a settlement, the courts of equity came
to recognize as a distinct property interest, with characteristics peculiar
to itself, what was known as her separate equitable estate. 62 This estate
arose when property, either real or personal,63 was transferred by an
instrument that manifested an intention that it was to be held to her
sole and separate use. 64 No particular form of words was necessary to
bring the estate into existence.65 The only requirement in this connection was that the property in question be designated expressly by
the terms of the transfer, or by proper implication therefrom, as being
for the separate use of the wife.66 The estate was created by implication, for example, when the instrument transferring property to a
woman, although not reciting that it was for her separate use, empowered her to do acts with reference to it or to make dispositions of
it that were inconsistent with the normal marital rights of her husband.67 If the property was sufficiently designated as for her separate
use, the wife's separate equitable estate arose even when the transfer
was directly to her without the interposition of a trustee. 68 The holdso Scott v. Spashett, 3 Macn. & G. 599, 42 Eng. Rep. 391 (1851).
Davis v. Newton, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 537 at 544 (1843).
Littleton v. Sain, 126 Tenn. 461 at 465, 150 S.W. 423 (1912); Nixon v.
Rose, Trustee, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 425 at 430 (1855); Taylor v. Meads, 4 DeG., J. & S.
597 at 603, 46 Eng. Rep. 1050 (1865); Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1 at 22, 48
Eng. Rep. 838 (1840); Haskins, ''Estate by the Marital Right," 97 Umv. PA. L. R:sv.
345 at 351 (1949); 4 PoMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §1098 (1941); 2
STORY, EQUITY ]URIS.PRUDENCE, 13th ed., §1378 (1886); 2 TII'l'ANY, REAL PROPERTY,
3d ed., §485 (1939).
63 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 13th ed., §1378 (1886); Taylor v. Meads,
4 DeG., J. & S. 597 at 603, 48 Eng. Rep. 1050 (1865).
64Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wms. 316, 24 Eng. Rep. 746 (1725); Riley v. Riley, 25
Conn. 154 at 161 (1856).
'
65 Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 (1885); Tyrrell v. Hope, 2 Atk. 558, 26 Eng.
Rep. 735 (1743); 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §1381; Nixon v. Rose, Trustee, 12
Gratt. (Va.) 425 at 428 (1855); Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175 at 180, 39 Eng.
Rep. 361 (1830).
66 See note 65 supra.
67 See Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 at 648 (1885); Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich.
Eq. (S.C.) 43 at 49 (1853).
68 Cf. Baldwin v. Carter, 17 Day (Conn.) 201 (1845); Darley v. Darley, 3 Atk.
399, 26 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1746); see Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154 at 161 (1856);
61 See
62 Cf.
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ings to this effect were based on the maxim that equity never permits a
trust to fail for want of a trustee. When a transfer of this type was
made to a woman after her marriage, her husband was held to be the
trustee for her. 69
Whether or not the transfer was to a named trustee, however, the
wife's separate equitable estate did not arise, and the husband obtained
his ordinary legal or equitable rights in the property, unless the instrument of transfer manifested a clear purpose that it was to be held for
her separate use. 70 Thus even after the doctrine of the wife's separate
equitable estate came to pe recognized, the husband continued to have
his marital rights in ordinary trusts for the benefit of his wife in which
·no intention had been manifested that the property was to be held to
her separate use;71 and as to such trusts she of course continued to have
her equity to a settlement as previously had been the case.72
A separate equitable estate could be created for a married woman
by devise,73 bequest,74 or inter vivos transfer; 75 and it could be created
either during coverture76 or, by the weight of authority, before the
marriage. 77 In Pennsylvania, however, it was held that this estate
could not be created for a feme sole unless at the time of the transfer
of the property, her marriage with a designated individual was under
consideration;78 and in a North Carolina case,79 it was held that a
Harwood v. Root, 20 Fla. 940 at 955 (1884); Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195 at 197
(1852); Nixon v. Rose, Trustee, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 425 at 434 (1855).
69 See note 68 supra.
70 Pollard v. Merrill & Eximer,

15 Ala. 169 (1849); Bowen v. Sebree, 2 Bush (Ky.)
112 (1867); Lumb v. Milnes, 5 Ves. 517, 31 Eng. Rep. 712 (1800); Brown v. Clark,
3 Ves. 166, 30 Eng. Rep. 950 (1796); 2 STORY, EQUITY JURisPRUDBNCB §1381.
71 Pollard v. Merrill & Eximer, 15 Ala. 169 (1849); Lumb & Milnes, 5 Ves. 517,
31 Eng. Rep. 712 (1800); Brown v. Clark, 3 Ves. 166, 30 Eng. Rep. 950 (1796);
2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDBNCB §1381.
72Lumb v. Milnes, 5 Ves. 517, 31 Eng. Rep. 712 (1800); cf. Brown v. Clark,
3 Ves. 166, 30 Eng. Rep. 950 (1796).
78 E.g., Small v. Field, 102 Mo. 104, 14 S.W. 815 (1890); Goulder v. Camm,
1 DeG., F. & J. 146, 45 Eng. Rep. 315 (1859).
74 E.g., Bridges v. Wood, 4 Dana (Ky.) 610 (1836); Nixon v. Rose, Trustee, 12
Gratt. (Va.) 425 (1855); Wassell v. Leggatt, [1896] 1 Ch. 554; In re Tarsey's Trust,
L.R. 1 Eq. 561 (1866).
75 E.g., Saunders v. Harris, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 185 (1858).
76 E.g., Re Winn, 57 L.T.R. (N.S.) (Ch.) 282 (1887); cf. Barron v. Barron, 24
Vt. 375 (1852); see Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154 at 163 (1856).
77 E.g., Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla 629 (1885); Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195
(1852); Saunders v. Harris, 38 Tenn. (I Head) 185 (1858); In re Tarsey's Trust,
L.R. 1 Eq. 561 (1866); Goulder v. Camm, 1 DeG., F. & J. 146, 45 Eng. Rep. 315
(1859); 2 STORY, EQmTY JURisPRUDBNcB §1384.
78 E.g., Estate of Quin, 144 Pa. 444, 22 A. 965 (1891); Snyder's Appeal, 92 Pa.
504 (1880); 2 PBRRY, TRUSTS, 7th ed., §652, n. 98 (1929); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §146.1
(1939); 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDBNCB §1384, note a.
79 Apple v. Allen, 56 N.C. 120 (1856).
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bequest for the sole use of a single woman did not give rise to a separate equitable estate in her favor and that upon her subsequent marriage, her husband acquired his normal marital rights in the gift. If,
as seems to have been the situation, the bequest involved in the North
Carolina case was not made with reference to a marriage that was then
in contemplation, the North Carolina court did not preclude itself by
its holding from taking the position of the Pennsylvania decisions.
The separate equitable estate could be created by the husband,80
by the woman herself prior to her marriage,81 or by a third person.82
In courts of equity,83 as distinct from those of law,84 a wife's separate equitable estate was not subject to her husband's marital rights;
and it was also beyond the reach of his creditors. 85 If, however, a
gratuitous transfer of property for the separate use of a married woman
left the transferor unable to discharge his existing debts or if it was
made in order to place his assets beyond the reach of possible future
creditors, it was of course subject to the principles applicable to all
fraudulent conveyances and could be impeached by his creditors.86
In England87 and by the weight of authority in the United States,88
a married woman could alienate her separate equitable estate as if she
were a feme sole, in the absence of a statute or a provision in the trust
instrument to the contrary. In most of the jurisdictions that followed
this rule, her power to alienate extended to real property included in
her separate equitable estate,89 but in a few of them it was confined to
personal property and the rents and profits of real property held to her
separate use. 90 A minority view existed in some states, however, to the
80Alston v. Rowles, 13 Fla. 117 (1869); Re Winn, 57 L.T.R. (N.S.) (Ch.) 282
(1887); Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154 at 163 (1856).
81 Saunders v. Harris, 38 Tenn. (I Head) 185 (1858); cf. Brown v. MacGill, 87
Md. 161, 139 A. 613 (1898); Dean v. Brown, 5 B. & C. 336, 108 Eng. Rep. 125 (1826).
82 Bridges v. Wood, 4 Dana (Ky.) 610 (1836); Small v. Field, 102 Mo. 104, 14
S.W. 815 (1890); Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393, 26 Eng. Rep. 1026 (1746).
83 E.g., Alston v. Rowles, 13 Fla. 117 (1869); Botts v. Gooch, 97 Mo. 88, 11 S.W.
42 (1888); Tullett v. Armstrong, l Beav. 1, 48 Eng. Rep. 838 (1838); cf. White v.
Clasby, 101 Mo. 162 at 167, 14 S.W. 180 (1890); Perkins v. Elliott, 23 N.J. Eq. 526
at 528 (1872).
84 Cf. Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172 at 183 (1875).
85 E.g., Alston v. Rowles, 13 Fla. 117 (1869); Botts v. Gooch, 97 Mo. 88, 11 S.W.
42 (1889); Izod v. Lamb, l C. & J. 35 at 43, 148 Eng. Rep. 1325 (1830).
86 Cf., e.g., Alston v. Rowles, 13 Fla. 117 at 136 (1869).
87 See Tullett v. Armstrong, l Beav. l at 22, 48 Eng. Rep. 838 (1838).
88E.g., McCroan v. Pope, 17 Ala. 612 (1850); Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn.
145 (1949); Brown v. Kimbrough, 55 Ga. 41 (1875); Harding v. Cobb, 47 Miss. 599
(1873); Lewis v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418 at 424 (1852).
80E.g., Brown v. Kimbrough, 55 Ga. 41 (1875); Zeust v. Staffan, 14 App. D.C.
200 (1899); Pride v. Bubb, L.R. 7 Ch. 64 at 69 (1871); cf. Lewis v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418
at 424 (1852).
90 E.g., Taylor v. Cussen, 90 Va. 40 (1893); cf. Levy v. Darden, 38 Miss. 57 at
64 (1859).
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effect that a married woman could not alienate her separate equitable
estate unless she was given the power to do so by the terms of the
instrument creating it. 91
Even in the jurisdictions that normally permitted a married woman
to alienate her separate equitable estate, a provision in the instrument
creating it that _forbade such a transfer was upheld.92 This deviation
from the common-law rule against restraints upon alienation, which
invalidates a provision restraining the power of alienation in an instrument vesting either a legal or ·equitable title in fee or for life in a grantee, was established by the courts of equity. 93 They had found that
the power of disposition that they had extended to married women
over their separate equitable estates was subjecting them to the importunities of their husbands to such an extent as to threaten the security
that those estates had been designed to provide for them. 94 A separate
equitable estate with an annexed restraint upon its alienation could be
created even while the recipient was single; and if she married before
disposing of the estate, the restraint became effective and continued
throughout the duration of the marriage. 95 If she became discovert
and married again without having disposed of the property in the interim, the restraint again became effective during the subsequent
marriage. 96
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the separate equitable
estate of a married woman could not be subjected to the payment of her
ge~eral debts or obligations not incurred by her upon its faith and
credit. 97 In England98 and by the weight of authority in the United
States,99 however, she could render that estate liable in equity by so
91 Metcalf v. Cook, 2 R.I. 355 (1852); Dunn v. Dunn, 1 S.C. 350 (1869); c£
Wright v. Brown, 44 Pa. 224 (1863). The Florida court in Staley v. Hamilton, 19
Fla. 275 at 296 (1882), erroneously cited Dollner, Potter & Co. v. Snow, 16 Fla. 86
(1877) as having adopted this view.
92 E.g., Nixon v. Rose, Trustee, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 425 (1855); Tullett v. Armstrong,
1 Bea-v. 1, 48 Eng. Rep. 838 (1838); Clark v. Jaques, 1 Beav. 36, 48 Eng. Rep. 851
(1838).
93Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 377, 41 Eng. Rep. 390 (1839); see Robinson
v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 at 645 (1885); 1 ScoTr, TnusTS §146.1 (1939).
94 See Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 at 646 (1885).
· 95 Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 (1885); Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr.
377, 41 Eng. Rep. 390 (1839).
96 See Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 at 646 (1885).
97 Knox v. Jordan, 58 N.C. 175 (1859); Aguilar v. Aguilar, Lousada and Others,
5 Madd. 414, 56 Eng. Rep. 953 (1820); c£. Dollner, Potter & Co. v. Snow, 16 Fla.
86 (1877).,
98 E.g., Picard v. Hine, L.R. 5 Ch. 274 (1869); Aguilar v. Aguilar, Lousada and
Others, 5 Madd. 414, 56 Eng. Rep. 953 (1820).
99 E.g., McCravey's Aclmr. v. Todd, 66 Ala. 315 (1880); Dallas v. Heard, 32 Ga.
604 (1861); Coleman v. Wooley's Executor, 10 T.B. Mon. (Ky.) 320 (1850); Lincoln
v; Rowe, 51 Mo. 571 (1873); Webster v. Helm, 93 Tenn. 322, 24 S.W. 488 (1894).
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contracting as to indicate an intention that it was to be bound, except
when she was prohibited from doing so by the instrument that created
her estate. That intention could be expressed in the contract or it
could be implied from the fact that her separate equitable estate was to
derive a benefit from the transaction,1° 0 or from other circumstances
that evidenced it.101 But in several jurisdictions a married woman
could not charge her separate equitable estate unless the instrument
that created it authorized her to do so.102
The Wife's Separate Statutory Property
We have seen that the wife's equity to a settlement gave her a
limited protection from the harsh doctrines of the common law that
extended to her beneficial interests in ordinary trusts and to her other
assets that could be reached only in equity. We have seen, too, that
the recognition of her separate equitable estate afforded her a much
more extensive protection in the case of her interest in trusts established
for her separate use. Her other property interests, however, continued
to be subject to the original rules of the common law with reference to
the marital rights of her husband long after the fading out of the
feudal setting in which those rules had their origin.
To remedy this situation statutes were enacted during the nineteenth century1° 3 both in England104 and in the American states105
that freed the property of a wife either wholly or in part from control
100 Pentz v. Simonson and Wife, 13 N.J. Eq. 232 (1861); Yale v. Dederer, 22 N.Y.
450 (1860).
101 E.g., Coleman v. Wooley's Executor, 10 T.B. Mon. (Ky.) 390 (1850); Picard
v. Hine, L.R. 5 Ch. 274 (1869). In each of these cases the intention of the wife to
subject her separate equitable estate to her obligation was found in the fact that she was
living apart from her husband.
102 Cf., e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 82 ill. 530 (1876); Hardy v. Holly, 84 N.C.
661 (1881); MacConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476, 19 A. 306 (1890).
10s ScO'lT, TRUSTS §146.1 (1939); 3 VERNIER, A.MEruCAN FAMILY LAws 167 (1935);
Savage, ''Legislation as to Married Women's Property," 22 AM. L. REo. (N.S) 761 at
763 (1883).
104 Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Viet., c. 75; Married Women's
Property Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Viet., c. 93. These statutes are discussed in volume 16
of HALsBORY's LAws OF ENGLAND, 2d ed., 617-622 (1935). The policy that they embody
has been further extended by the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act,
1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V. c. 30.
1011E.g., Fla. Const. Art. XI, §§1, 2; Fla. Stat. (1949); §§689.11, 693.01, 708.03708.04, 708.06, 708.08; Mich. Const. Art. XVI, § 8; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§ 26.161
to 26.163, 26.171, 26.181 to 26.183; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§442.030, 451.250, 451.290;
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§50, 51, 56; N.C. Const. Art. X, § 6; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950)
§§52-1 to 52-15; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1952) tit. 48, §§31, 32, 71; Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, §§33 to 44, 64 to 66, 70; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951)
Art. 4614; Va. Code (1950) §§55-35 to 55-37, 55-39, 55-47. The relevant statutes of
the different states are summarized on pages 171 to 184 of Volume 3 of VERNil!R's
AMERICAN FAMILY I.Aw (1935), as they existed when that treatise was published.
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by her husband. The statutes of the various jurisdictions differ
greatly, hut in general they provide that the property owned by a wife
at her marriage or acquired by her thereafter shall become her separate property. They deprive her husband more or less completely of
his common-law marital rights in this property and provide that it shall
not be liable for his debts in the absence of a specified type of assent
thereto by her; and they give her at least partial control over it. They
are referred to as the married women's property acts or married
women's rights acts; and under them her property other than her separate equitable estate becomes what is known as her separate statutory
property or separate statutory estate.106 This separate statutory property exists by virtue of the statutes in question and is to be distinguished
from the separate equitable estate which arises when the title is vested
in someone for the separate use of a married woman.107
Because of the due process clause and other provisions in relevant
constitutions, the married women's property acts did not extinguish the
rights of a husband that had vested in the property of his wife prior to
their enactment.108 They were, however, applicable to mere expectancies of the husband that had not ripened into vested rights at the
time the statutes were passed.109 When, for example, a wife owned a
remainder in land following an existing life estate belonging to another,
her husband's prospect of acquiring marital rights in the land was a
mere expectancy until her estate became possessory; and a statute
enacted before the termination of the preceding life estate was effective
to prevent the subsequent arising of such rights.110 Similarly, the married women's property acts control property acquired by a wife after
they become effective, even in the case of a previously existing mar106 E.g., Harwood v. Root, 20 Fla. 940 (1884); Dollner, Potter & Co. v. Snow,
16 Fla. 86 (1877); see Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 at 650 (1885); cf. Blood
v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551 at 571, 121 S. 886 (1929).
107 Kelly v. Turner, 74 Ala. 513 (1883); Dollner, Potter & Co. v. Snow, 16 Fla.
86 (1877); accord, Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172 (1875); see Seedhouse v. Broward,
34 Fla. 509 at 521, 16 S. 425 (1894).
10s Rose v. Sanderson, 38 ill. 247 (1865); Rose v. Rose, 104 Ky. 48, 46 S.W. 524
(1898); Westervelt v. Greeg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854); cf. Tyson v. Mattair, 8 Fla. 107
(1858); Powell v. Bowen, 279 Mo. 280, 214 S.W. 142 (1919); see Allen v. Hanks,
136 U.S. 300 at 306 (1889); Manning v. Manning, 24 Ala. 386 at 387 (1854). Contra:
Rugh v. Ottenheimer, 6 Ore. 231 (1877). In the latter case, a constitutional provision
that the property of a marrie~ woman should not be subject to the debts of her husband
was applied to the property that she had owned before the adoption of the constitution,
although another section of that document provided that existing private rights should not
be affected by changes made by the constitution. The court endeavored to sustain its
position on the specious ground that since the marriage relation affects the entire public,
the marital right of the husband in his wife's property is not strictly a private right.
lOOBaker's Executors v. Kilgore, 145 U.S. 487 (1891); Hill v. Chambers, 30 Mich.
422 (1874); Taylor v. Taylor, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 490 (1883).
110 Prater v. Hoover, 41 Tenn. (I Cold.) 544 (1860).
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riage,111 and abolish her husband's estate during coverture in present
freehold estates so acquired by her.112
Although these statutes created married women's separate statutory
estates, they did not abolish separate equitable estates that were in
existence when the statutes were passed;113 and, as enacted in most
jurisdictions, they do not prevent the creation of such estates thereafter.114 The powers conferred by statute on married women with
respect to their separate statutory property are so broad that separate
equitable estates are not now often created in their behalf for the purpose of giving them freedom of action with reference to their assets.111;
In Tennessee, however, the separate equitable estate can still be so
employed as to afford needed protection to a wife who might otherwise
be induced by the wiles of her husband to make a disadvantageous
transfer of her property. This end can be attained in that state even
since the enactment of the married women's property acts, by creating
a trust for her separate use and coupling with it a restraint upon her
power to alienate her interest.116 This device has rarely been used in
recent years, however. The statutes of the District of Columbia117
and Virginia118 perhaps sanction the same practice, since they provide
not only that separate equitable estates can still be created but also that
they are held according to the provisions of the instruments by which
they are brought into existence. The Tennessee holding is reasonable;
but the few other courts that have passed on the question have taken
the contrary position. They have held that when the wife's disabilities
of coverture are in large measure removed by statute, the reason that
previously existed for permitting a restraint upon her power of alienation, that would not have been sustained in the case of a person
sui juris, has been extinguished, and that the restraint is invalid.119
111 E.g.,

Allen v. Hanks, 136 U.S. 300 (1889); see Rose v. Rose, 104 Ky. 48 at 52, 46

s.w. 524 (1898).

Van Riper, 44 ill. 58 at 65 (1867).
v. Browning, 98 ill. 282 (1881); Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
of Baltimore, 170 Md. 615, 185 A. 335 (1936); see Neville v. Cheshire, 163 Ala. 390
at 396, 50 S. 1005 (1909).
114 Kelly v. Turner, 74 Ala. 513 (1883); Dollner, Potter & Co. v. Snow, 16 Fla.
86 (1877); Lee v. Belknap, 163 Ky. 418, 173 S.W. 1129 (1915); Musson v. Trigg,
51 Miss. 172 (1875); MacConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476, 19 A. 306 (1890); Travis
v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S.W. 1075 (1916); Seedhouse v. Broward, 34 Fla. 509 at 521,
16 S. 425 (1894). But cf. Olive v. Walton, 33 Miss. 103 (1857).
115 Cf. 2 Bom!RT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs §234 (1935); MADDEN, PERSONS AND
DoMBsTic RELATIONS 120 (1931); l ScOTT, TRUSTS §146.1 (1939).
116 Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S.W. 1075 (1916).
m D.C. Code (1951) §30-206.
11s Va. Code (1950) §55-47.
119 Cropper v. Bowles, 150 Ky. 393, 150 S.W. 380 (1912); cf. Deering v. Tucker,
55 Me. 284 (1867); Brown v. McGill, 87 Md. 161, 39 A. 613 (1898); Pacific Nat.
112

See Cole

11s Caipenter

v.
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The married women's property acts have rendered the wife's
equity to a settlement even more completely obsolete than her separate
equitable estate. She had that right only in connection with her assets
that were within the cognizance of equity. Those assets, including her
beneficial interest in trusts other than those for her separate use, fall
within the scope of typical married women's property acts and, when
obtained by her subsequent to the effective date of such acts, become
part of her separate statutory property.120 Her equity to a settlement
cannot exist, therefore, with respect to any interest that she has
obtained since the passage of the acts; and few, if any, marriages contracted before that time are subsisting.
It follows that instances are rare in which the rules with reference
to the separate equitable estate and the equity to a settlement are important in current transactions. The present state of title to realty, however, is sometimes dependent upon the application of the rules concerning the separate equitable estate. This situation is of course most
likely to be encountered in evaluating past transactions involving separate equitable estates that were created before the enactment of the
married women's property acts, since those acts largely eliminated the
occasion for the creation of such estates thereafter. Probably the benefit most frequently derived today from an understanding of the doctrines of the separate equitable ·estate and the equity to a settlement
lies in the fact that one is enabled thereby to avoid the use of old precedents involving those interests in factual situations to which they
have been rendered inapplicable by the married women's property acts.
Under the statutes of some jurisdictions a married woman can convey, transfer or encumber her separate statutory property of all types
as if she were a feme sole;121 but in a number of states her power in
these respects is less extensive. The statutes of Florida122 and several
Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175 (1882). See notes, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 426, 428 (1910);
1917A L.R.A. 679. It may be observed, too, that the objective formerly achieved by
upholding a restraint upon the power of alienating a separate equitable estate can be
attained in most states by establishing an ordinary spendthrift trust for the benefit of the
wife. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §234 (1935).
120·cf. 2 BISHOP, I.Aw OF MArouED WOMEN §110 (1875).
121 E.g., D.C. Code (1951) §30-201; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.161; Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1951) §§451.250, 451.290; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Beagles, 333 Mo. 568, 62 S.W.
(2d) 800 (1933); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §51. The relevant statutes of the different
states are summarized on pages 298 to 316 of Volume 3 of VERNIER'S .AMERICAN FAMILY
I.Aw (1935), as they existed when that treatise was published.
122 Fla: Stat. (1949) §§693.01, 708.04, 708.08. A married woman can, however,
convey her Florida realty other than homestead directly to her husband without his joinder
in the deed. Id. §689.11.
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other jurisdictions/23 for example, permit her to convey her real property only by a deed in which she is joined by her husband; and the
statutes of Delaware124 and Texas125 require her to acknowledge separate and apart from her husband her deeds conveying her separate
statutory property. The statutes of North Carolina126 also require her
to acknowledge such deeds, but the acknowledgement of deeds executed since the effective date of section 21 of chapter 73 of the North
Carolina Laws of 1945 need not be taken apart from her husband.127
In some jurisdictions all such special formalities as joinder by the husband and acknowledgment or separate acknowledgment by the wife,
as are required by statute in the case of conveyances of her separate
statutory real property, are required also in connection with the conveyance of real property that is included in her separate equitable
estate;128 but in other jurisdictions these special statutory requirements
are held not to be applicable to her separate equitable estate.129 Even
in the latter jurisdictions, the instrument by which a separate equitable
estate is created can of course require joinder by the husband and
similar formalities in the conveyance of that estate.130
In several states a procedure is established by statute for a married
woman under stated circumstances to be declared a free dealer or femesole trader and thereby to acquire greater contractual capacity than she
otherwise would have.131 By complying with this procedure she is
enabled in some of these states to convey her real property without the
special formalities required by their statutes in the case of other mar123 E.g., Ala. Code (Supp. 1950) tit. 34, §73; N.C. Const. Art. X, §6; N.C. Gen.
Stat. (1950) § 52-4; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1952) tit. 48, § 32; Tex. Civ. Stat.
(Vernon, 1951) arts. 1299, 4614.
124 Del. Rev. Code (1935) §3661.
125 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) art. 1299.
12s N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §§52-2, 52-4, 52-7.
121 Id., §47-116.
12s E.g., Taylor v. Cussen, 90 Va. 40, 17 S.E. 721 (1893) Goinder by husband
necessary); cf. Louisville, St. L. & T. Ry. v. Stephens, 96 Ky. 401, 29 S.W. 14 (1895)
(acknowledgment by wife necessary); TIFFANY, R:eAr. PROPERTY, 3d ed., §485 (1939);
see Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572 at 665 (1879) Goinder by husband and separate
acknowledgment by wife necessary).
129 E.g., Cadematori v. Gauger, 160 Mo. 352, 61 S.W. 195 (1901) Goinder by
husband, which at that time was required in conveyance of separate statutory real property, unnecessary in conveyance of separate equitable estate); Turner v. Shaw, 96 Mo.
22, 8 S.W. 897 (1888); cf. Reizenberger v. Shelton, 86 N.J. Eq. 92, 97 A. 293 (1916);
Maiben v. Bobe, 6 Fla. 381 at 414 (1855) (dissenting opinion).
lS0Cf. Maiben v. Bobe, 6 Fla. 381 at 414 (1855) (dissenting opinion); Cadematori
v. Gauger, 160 Mo. 352 at 366, 61 S.W. 195 (1901); Reizenberger v. Shelton, 86 N.J.
Eq. 92 at 96, 97 A. 293 (1916).
131 E.g., Fla. Stat. (1949) §§ 62.38 to 62.46; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, Supp. 1952)
c. 209, §10; Nev. Comp. Gen. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §§3390 to 3394; Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, §§41-44; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) art. 4626. Similar
statutes previously in effect have been repealed in recent years in a number of juris-
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ried women. Thus in Florida132 and Pennsylvania,1 33 a free dealer
can convey without the joinder of her husband that in those states is a
prerequisite to the validity of conveyances of other married women. In
North Carolina, however, at a time when the statutes134 provided a
method by which a married woman could be registered as a free dealer,
it was held that compliance with those statutes did not empower her
.to convey her real property without the joinder of her husband;135 and
the Texas statute136 under which a married woman may be declared a
free dealer "for mercantile and trading purposes" doubtless does not
dispense with the special formalities required in that state137 in the
case of conveyances by other married women. Even in Pennsylvania
where as previously stated a free dealer can convey her other real property without the joinder of her husband, it has been held that such
joinder is necessary in a conveyance of her separate equitable estate.138

Respective Duties of the Husband and Wife with Reference
to the Support of th~ Family
The statutes that abrogate or diminish the husband's marital rights
in the property of his wife ordinarily do not themselves otherwise
change the relationship existing between them or relieve him from the
obligation to support her and the family or from the other responsibilities that he had at common law.139 These duties of the husband
had their origin at a time when he could use in discharging them the
proceeds available as a result of his marital rights in any property owned
by his wife; and their continued existence since those marital rights
were extinguished or greatly reduced in scope has often been deplored.
More than seventy-five years ago the following comment was made
about the married women's rights act then in effect in Massachusetts:
"... the act ... leaves but little, as respects property and personal rights, to be complained of by the most ardent advocate of
dictions as having been rendered unnecessary by other statutes that have greatly extended
the contractual capacity of all married women. E.g., N.C. Laws 1945, c. 635.
132 Lerch v. Barnes, 61 Fla. 672, 54 S. 763 (1911).
133 Wilson v. Coursin, 72 Pa. 306 (1872); cf Thornton v. Pierce, 328 Pa. 11, 194
A. 897 (1937).
134 N.C. Gen Stat. §§52.22, 52.23 (1943). These statutes have since been repealed.
N.C. Laws 1945, c. 635.
135 Council v. Pridgen, 153 N.C. 443, 69 S.E. 404 (1910).
186 Tex Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) art. 4626.
137Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) art. 1299 (requiring separate aclmowledgment
by wife); id., art. 4614 (requiring joinder by husband).
188 People's Sav. Bank v. Denig, 131 Pa. 241, 18 A. 1083 (1890).
1S9Rogers v. Newby, (Fla. 1949) 41 S. (2d) 451 (holding that husband continues
liable for wife's pure tort); cf. Citizens' St. Ry. v. Twiname, 121 Ind. 375, 23 N.E.
159 (1890); Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872); see Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y.
17 at 24 (1883); Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353 at 367, 7 S.E. 335 (1888).

1953]

RrGHTS OF HUSBAND IN PROPERTY OF WIFE

879

the policy which yields to wives the double advantages of matrimony and single bliss, and lifts from the shoulders of their husbands none of the burdens borne when the law gave them compensatory advantages. It remains only to add a provision compelling every young man to marry instantly the girl who chooses him,
and the end of domestic woe will have come in Massachusetts.
Then she can have, as she can have now if the man will submit
to the marriage, for her sole and separate use, to accumulate till
her husband dies, all that she owned before her marriage, all that
comes to her afterward, and all that she can acquire by her labor
and skill; while he provides for her house room, meals, clothing,
and the other necessaries of life. . . . If she chooses, she may
employ her time with domestic cares; or if she chooses, she may
leave her babes for him to look after and nurse, and her meals for
him to prepare with his own, while she engages in business on her
separate account, and accumulates money-not a cent of which or
its increase is she required to appropriate to the support of her
family or even of herself,-all must be borne by the husband."140
Similar complaints, couched, however, in more temperate language,
have been voiced in recent years. 141 As a concession to this view,
statutes have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions that impose
upon the wife142 or upon her property,143 generally1 44 or under stated
circumstances,1 45 a liability for all146 or for specified portions147 of the
family expenses. Some of these statutes expressly require a wife to
support her husband out of her separate property when he has not
deserted her and is both without means and unable from infirmity to
140 2 B1sHOP, LAw OP MA.Immn WoMEN §727 (1875).
1413 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 170 (1935); cf. Haskins, ''Estate by the
Marital Right," 97 Umv. PA. L. REv. 345 at 352 (1949).
142 E.g., N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §14-0708; Banner Mercantile Co. v. Hendricks, 24
N.D. 16, 138 N.W. 993 (1912).
143 E.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 83, §10; ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936)
c. 68, §15; Iowa Code (1946) §597.14; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§451.250, 451.260 (wife's
personal property and annual products of her real estate liable for debts incurred by her
husband for necessaries for the family).
144E.g., ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 68, §15.
145 E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952 reissue) §42-201 (property of wife, with stated
exceptions, liable for necessaries furnished the family, only after execution against her
husband has been returned unsatisfied); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, §116
(property of wife liable for debts contracted by her for necessaries furnished the family,
only after execution against her husband has been returned unsatisfied).
146 E.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 83, §10; ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936)
c. 68, §15; Iowa Code (1946) §597.14.
147 E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952 reissue) §42-201 (property of wife liable only for
necessaries furnished the family); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, §116 (wife liable
only for debts contracted by her for articles necessary for the support of the family).
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support himself.148 Even a diamond shirt stud bought and used by
a husband has been held to be a family expense for which his wife is
liable under the statute149 that is in effect in Iowa;150 but under an
identical Illinois statute,151 a ring bought by a spouse for his own use
is not regarded as such an expense.152 In many states no statute rendering the wife liable for family expenses has been passed.
It frequently is said that the imposition of this liability on the wife
should be extended, not only by the enactment of such statutes in jurisdictions where there now are none, but also by broadening the scope
of many of the existing statutes. The argument for this position is
based on sympathy for an impecunious husband married to an extravagant wife of means, on a desire to protect credit-extending tradesmen
who are misled as to the financial status of a husband by the expenditures of his more affluent wife, and on the fact that the husband no
longer has the rights in his wife's property that compensated him at
common law for the duty placed on him alone to support his wife and
family.
Statutes of general application should, however, be evaluated on
the basis of their total effect rather than on their operation in a rarely
occurring situation. Although much of the wealth of the nation is in
feminine hands, the opulent wife who unreasonably declines to aid an
unfortunate husband is still the exception. Far more typical is the
family of little means in which the wife has a small ip.heritance or
meager personal earnings of which she should not be deprived against _
her will because of the failure of an improvident husband to make
proper efforts to support his family. Larger numbers of married
women, to be sure, are gainfully employed than in the past, but most
women still forego their opportunity for a financially remunerative
career when they marry; and if marital difficulties become intolerable
or misfortune overtakes them years later, it is often difficult or impossible for them to earn a livelihood. It is submitted that any assets that
they have or acquire during the marriage may well be preserved from
- being dissipated without their consent. When the desirability of
retaining for them this safeguard is weighed against the advantage of
relieving one who furnishes supplies for the family from the necessity
of investigating the credit standing of the husband, the latter does not
bulk large.
14s E.g., N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 14-0703.
149 Iowa Code (1946) §597.14.
150 Neasham v. McNair, 103 Iowa 695, 72 N.W. 773 (1897).
151 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 68, §15.
152 Cf. Hyman v. Harding, 162 Ill. 357, 44 N.E. 754 (1896).

